Areas of Expertise
My research interests lie in the empirical exploration, from an economic perspective, of factors that affect individual and group participation in public programs, with a focus on environmental issues. This broad interest has taken two distinct paths, bridging the efficiency and cost-effectiveness paradigms in environmental economics. Much of my work has been directed toward developing improved measures of hypothetical and actual demand for public, environmental resources: with “hypothetical” corresponding to contingent valuation research and “actual” involving related experimental economic research on public good provision mechanisms. I have also established an active experimental economics and field research program on the design of incentive programs for reducing emissions from nonpoint and point sources. A frequent subject of my work is water quality, ranging from the non-market valuation of damages to ground and surface water resources, to the design and assessment of non-point source pollution incentive policies, to point-source emissions trading at the watershed level.
Prior to graduate school, I served as a Peace Corps Volunteer, working on capture fisheries management in northern Cameroun.
Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1993
M.S., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1988
B.A., Pomona College, 1983
Nonmarket Valuation and Public Goods
Poe, G.L. and C.A. Vossler, forthcoming. “Consequentiality and Contingent Values: An Emerging Paradigm” in J. Bennett ed., International Handbook on Non-Market Valuation. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishers.
Messer, K.D., G.L. Poe, D. Rondeau, W.D. Schulze and C.A. Vossler. 2010. Exploring Voting Anomalies Using a Demand Revealing Random Price Voting Mechanism. Journal of Public Economics 94:308–317.
Bateman, I.J., A. Munro, and G.L. Poe. 2008. Asymmetric Dominance Effects in Choice Experiments and Contingent Valuation. Land Economics 84(1):115-127.
Vossler, C.A., G.L. Poe, W.D. Schulze and K. Segerson, 2006. Communication and Incentive Mechanisms Based on Group Performance: An Experimental Study of Nonpoint Source Pollution Control. Economic Inquiry 44(4):599-613 (Awarded Editor’s Choice Article – Economic Inquiry 2006).
Poe, G.L., K.L. Giraud and J.B. Loomis, 2005. Computational Methods for Measuring the Difference of Empirical Distributions. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 87(2):353-365.
Water Quality Policy
Suter J.F., K. Segerson, C.A. Vossler, and G.L. Poe, 2010. Voluntary-Threat Approaches to Reduce Ambient Water Pollution. American Journal of Agricultural Economics92(4): 1195-1213.
Sado, Y., R. N. Boisvert and G.L. Poe, 2010. Potential Cost Savings from Discharge Permit Trading: A Case Study and Implications for Water Quality Trading. Water Resources Research 44:020501.
Suter, J.F., G.L. Poe and N.L. Bills, 2008. Do Landowners Respond to Land Retirement Incentives? Evidence from the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program? Land Economics 84(1):17-30.
Bateman, I. J., P. Cooper, S. Georgiou, S. Navrud, G. L. Poe, R. Ready, P. Riera, M. Ryan, and C. A. Vossler. 2005. Economic valuation of policies for managing acidity in remote mountain lakes: Examining validity through scope sensitivity testing. Aquatic Sciences 67:274-291.
Bergstrom, J.C., K.J. Boyle and G.L. Poe, eds., 2001. The Economic Value of Water Quality. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishers.